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BOOK REVIEW
How Federal Judicial Administration
Came To Be the Way It Is
THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JuDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. By Peter Gra-
ham Fish. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973.
Pp. xiv, 528. $20.00.
Differences about how the business of federal circuit and dis-
trict courts should be administered-as distinguished from how
their cases should be decided-down through the years have pre-
sented a persistent conflict between an ideal of national uniformity
and an effort to maintain local control over administrative details.
In one sense this has been a contest between reformers who have
sought increased efficiency in federal judicial administration and
local judges whose rallying cry was judicial independence and whose
personal interest was in continuing to run things as they were accus-
tomed within their own little domains. Occasionally patronage was
involved. This did not mean, however, that the locally preferred
procedures were always inefficient-sometimes they worked better
in a particular district or circuit than proposed reforms would have.
Still, more often than not they were less efficient. Apart from that,
the lack of uniformity created difficulties for lawyers handling cases
outside their own districts or circuits and for judges deciding ap-
peals. Only the local bar and bench, acquainted with its own pecu-
liarities, profited from the diversity.
The origins of administrative diversity are easy to understand.
After United States Supreme Court Justices ceased riding circuit,
there was no unifying force in the federal system. Each of the courts
was left largely to its own devices. Congressional enactments dealt
with few aspects of administration, and the Supreme Court did not
concern itself with such matters. Thus, isolated judges developed
their own rules for their courts. Once established, the local rules
gave rise to vested interests, and staff members, assuming that the
rules were based on law, would have been surprised to learn that the
same rules were not in force in every other federal court.
It was well into the twentieth century before serious efforts were
made to improve judicial administration in the United States. Dean
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Roscoe Pound's famous 1906 St. Paul address' called attention to
the problems. Herbert Harley, founder of the American Judicature
Society, and a few other dedicated jurists persisted, always against
heavy odds, in preaching the doctrine that justice is illusory unless
efficiently administered. Chief Justice Taft knew from his executive
experience the importance of organizational techniques and tried to
introduce some of them in the judiciary. Yet Taft was so involved
in influencing the selection of new judges that he had little time for
reform of judicial administration except as it might be lobbied
through Congress. Not until Warren Burger's day did another Chief
Justice treat administration as a matter of major importance.2 In
the states, however, others had taken up the burden. Foremost
among these was Arthur T. Vanderbilt, 3 who as Chief Justice of New
Jersey gave that state the best administered system of justice in
America. Indeed Vanderbilt, together with John J. Parker of North
Carolina and Harold M. Stephens of the District of Columbia, con-
stituted the forefront of the small group of jurists that beginning in
the 1930's was pressing with slow success for better judicial adminis-
tration in the federal courts.
The story of that slow, limited advance is the theme of Profes-
sor Fish's book. The author is the Director of Graduate Studies in
the Department of Political Science at Duke University and is a
long-time student of the federal judicial system. Starting with Taft
in 1922, the book presents a factual account of how some measure
of administrative control has been gradually achieved in the federal
district and circuit courts, always over vigorous opposition, and
often with only half-hearted support from the judges who did not
actively oppose it.' The author had access to a wealth of original
source material, including the letters and private papers of a score
or more of Supreme Court Justices and circuit court judges, inter-
views with others, and minutes of meetings. He tells a detailed and
1. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
reprinted in 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 178 (1937).
2. Chief Justice Hughes was interested in improved administration, but his reaction
and that of his colleagues to the Roosevelt court-packing plan in the 1930's made him ex-
tremely wary of any suggestion that involved greater centralization of the federal judicial
organization.
3. Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., came u, through the New Jersey court
system as a prot6g6 of Vanderbilt and carried forward the same interest in good administra-
tion but had less opportunity to further the cause.
4. The opening sentence in the book is: "From its inception, the hallmarks of the federal
judiciary's administrative system have been independence, decentralization, and individual-
ism." Of these, the prime virtue asserted was "independence," and, to use a frontier phrase,
some of the judges were "as independent as a hog on ice."
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sometimes repetitious story, seldom interrupted by his value judg-
ments or critical analysis. Only in the brief final chapter does the
author bring forth his own views, which are strongly sympathetic
with the reformers' efforts to bring administrative order into the
system. Thus the reader gets from the book a thoroughly docu-
mented record of the reform movement, telling who proposed and
who opposed at each short step5 along the way.
Briefly summarizd, the steps were the establishment in 1922 of
the national Judicial Conference, which met annually and originally
was made up of the senior judge from each circuit with the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court presiding; the gradual development
and expansion of Circuit Conferences, with membership limited to
the circuit judges but with guests invited, meeting usually once a
year both for social purposes and to discuss circuit business; the
1939 creation of the Circuit Councils consisting of the circuit judges
and acting, within each circuit, as the supervisory agency having
some responsibility for the administration of the circuit and district
courts; the formation in 1939 of the Administrative Office of the
Federal Courts with gradually increasing responsibility for the
housekeeping and management of the system; and finally, the initi-
ation in 1967 of the Federal Judicial Center6 as a research and public
relations arm for the whole federal judicial system. Major changes
as time went on were the 1958 law providing that chief judges of the
circuit courts could not hold that office beyond age 70, thus limiting
the national Judicial Conference to somewhat younger judges, the
gradual increase of membership to include some district and special
court judges, and the slow expansion of the administrative rule-
making authority of the Conference. Yet the task of reform has only
begun. The author quotes former Senator Joseph D. Tydings, Jr.'
5. One judge who for a time was remarkably active in both proposing and opposing
various measures was Martin T. Manton, then Chief Judge of the Second Circuit. His activity
of course ended when he was convicted of receiving bribes in return for his judgments. See J.
BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND OTHER HIGH CRIMES AND MISDE-
MEANORS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 23-93 (1962). Manton's successor as Chief Judge of the
Second Circuit was the wise and incorruptible Learned Hand, who in contrast had very little
interest in administrative matters. He was inclined to let administrative problems solve
themselves whenever possible.
6. A current study, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, COMPARATIVE REPORT ON INTERNAL OPER-
ATING PROCEDURES OF UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1973), shows a wide variety of
administrative practices.
The National Center for State Courts was later created to serve similar state purposes,
and the 2 agencies have been collaborating closely. The Advisory Council for Appellate
Justice, a nonofficial body, is sponsored by the National Center but is working with both
agencies.
7. Until his retirement, Tydings was chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Im-
19741
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as saying in 1969: "Our courts are administered today in essentially
the same way that they were two centuries ago." There still is no
truly national system of federal courts. And although the circuits
now have administrative directors to take care of judicial house-
keeping chores, the chief judges of the several circuits, who are the
circuits' chief administrative officers, are still designated solely on
the basis of seniority rather than administrative experience or abil-
ity.
One of the most persistent and troublesome problems for the
federal judiciary has been the removal, or relieving, of incompetent
or misbehaving judges. Short of a criminal conviction, sanctions
against misconduct are practically unavailable. Impeachment is no
longer a realistic remedy. Moreover, it is unclear whether the Judi-
cial Councils, which are the only agencies supposedly having super-
visory authority in the circuits, can relieve a judge of his judicial
duties.8 In fact, according to Professor Fish, Judicial Councils,
which lack the power of subpoena, are characterized by their "pas-
sivity, not activity." The "coercive instruments" that they possess
consist of "consultation, reasoned arguments and persuasion, and
publicity, but not penal sanctions." With good and honorable
judges, these are sufficient. For 99 judges out of one hundred no
other sanctions are needed. But the hundredth judge is still there,
and he is the one about whose misdeeds the public learns and whose
evil reputation blackens public esteem for the whole judiciary. The
national Judicial Conference's prompt adoption of rigorous finan-
cial reporting standards in 1969-after the Abe Fortas affair-and
its subsequent adoption of the American Bar Association's new
Standards of Judicial Conduct are obvious manifestations of federal
judicial integrity. They give assurance that federal judges as a group
adhere to ethical standards far higher than those that prevail among
the general citizenry. But the fact remains that there is no efficient
administrative machinery for dealing with the rare but notorious
miscreant who flouts the standards.
The other major administrative problem in the federal judicial
system derives also from the local orientation of many of the judges
and courts. Some districts have much heavier dockets and longer
trial delays than others, and the appellate loads in the circuits are
also uneven. In addition, the geography of the circuits is based
provements in the Judicial Machinery. He is now a member of the American Bar Association
Committee on Coordination of Federal Judicial Improvements.
8. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1969).
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largely on historical accident. There is machinery for reassigning
judges from their home districts or circuits to others where help is
needed, but it is a slow and cumbersome process that helps in a
small way, especially in emergencies, but does not meet the whole
system's needs. Moreover, reassignments under the present system
depend largely upon the convenience and preferences of the individ-
ual judge; there is no coordinator with authority to reassign judges
from low-docket areas to courts in which their services would be
more useful. Many judges would vigorously oppose any such cen-
tralized assignment power, since they prefer to stay in their own
bailiwicks except for occasional temporary reassignments to inter-
esting spots that afford something of a vacation aspect. Thus the
only ultimate solution is for federal judges to be regarded as mem-
bers of a national court system rather than as the heads of many
small, local courts.
Two other recent developments also emphasize the necessity for
unification of the federal court system. Both arise from the vast
increase in case filings and from the resulting increase in appeals.
One is the inability of the United States Supreme Court to give
adequate attention to all appeals from the circuit courts and state
supreme courts. This problem gave rise to the controversial proposal
of a mini-supreme court to assume part of the load. The other
development is the unfortunate increase in intercircuit conflicts,10
which leave unresolved contradictory applications of federal law.
Judge Shirley Hufstedler's proposal" for a "central," or national,
division of the United States Court of Appeals appears to be a
possible basis for a politically acceptable solution of the problem
posed by these two developments. It must be noted that Professor
Fish's study stops short of presenting the mass of current discussion
on these developments. The need for unification of the sprawling
system is evident, however, from the administrative history that he
recounts.
9. This was part of the so-called "Freund Report." See Creation of New National Court
of Appeals Is Proposed by Blue-Ribbon Study Group, 59 A.B.A.J. 139 (1973); Freund, Why
We Need the National Court of Appeals, id. at 247; Gressman, The National Court of Ap-
peals: A Dissent, id. at 253.
10. Even intracircuit conflicts present a problem. These arise from the decisions of
different 3-judge panels within a circuit. Resolution of intracircuit conflicts by en banc hear-
ings becomes increasingly burdensome and wasteful of judicial time as the number of judges
in a circuit increases along with the increase in the number of appeals.
11. See Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44
S. CAL. L. REv. 901 (1971). Judge Hufstedler's proposals have been substantially refined since
her 1971 statement and are now being presented through the Advisory Council for Appellate
Justice.
1974]
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Many of the administrative ills of the federal judicial system
spring from the vagaries of federal jurisdiction.' 2 Professor Fish's
book, quite properly, does not discuss them. These aspects of the
federal courts' administrative problems are not of the judges' own
making, and they must be dealt with by the Congress that estab-
lished the variant areas of jurisdiction in the first place. Yet the
courts cannot, by pointing to their jurisdictional difficulties, evade
responsibility for the other ills that grew out of their own independ-
ence and individualistic decentralization.
The Circuit Councils cannot adequately supervise the district
courts. The Circuit Conferences serve a useful function, though they
vary in quality and have little control over administrative matters.
The national Judicial Conference is not ideally constituted, in terms
of membership criteria, to serve as the judiciary's legislative body.
Beyond that, its legislative powers are limited, and its executive
functioning is feeble and uncertain. The administrative offices at
both the national and circuit levels do a good housekeeping job, but
that is about as far as they are authorized to go. Furthermore, fed-
eral judges should not be forced to lobby in Congress for their appro-
priations or for desired changes, wise or unwise, in laws governing
the jurisdiction and administration of their courts. Yet as the Fish
study demonstrates federal judges have often done so in the past.
Less of this occurs today than formerly, but even a little is too much.
The thesis of the Fish book, somewhat incidentally avowed, is
that "politics" has much to do, presumably too much to do, with
federal judicial administration. The historical information that
makes up the bulk of the book amply documents the thesis. We are
told only what has happened in the past, not what the answers
should be. Yet it is clear that answers must be devised. That is
where this scholarly study leaves us.
ROBERT A. LEFLAR*
12. See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICrON: A GENERAL VIEw (1973). This
book, written by one of the most knowledgeable judges on the United States Court of Appeals
bench, is thoughtfully reviewed by Judge Gibbons of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 564 (1973).
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; Distinguished Professor of Law
Emeritus, University of Arkansas; Director, Appellate Judges Seminars, New York Univer-
sity. B.A. 1922, University of Arkansas; LL.B. 1927, S.J.D. 1932, Harvard University.
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